Has Foreign Entry Made Domestic Banks More Efficient? by Unite, Angelo A. & Sullivan, Michael J.
25
No. 2002-06 October 2002





I I I I I
PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE
FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
Surian sa mga Pag-aaral
Pangkaunlaran ng Pilipinas
1977 1977 1977 1977 1977
2002 2002 2002 2002 2002
__________
*The authors are Professor of Economics, De La Salle University–
Manila and Associate Professor of Finance, University of Nevada–Las
Vegas, respectively.
n the 1990s, the Philippine government set
about on two courses of action that were in-
tended to increase the efficiency of domestic
banks. One was the passage in 1994 of Re-
public Act No. 7721 or "An Act Liberalizing the Entry and
Scope of Operations of Foreign Banks in the Philippines"
which aimed at allowing greater participation of foreign
banks in the domestic market. The other was the enact-
ment, in increments, of various regulations throughout
the 1990s which aimed at providing incentives to attract
foreign ownership of common stocks in Philippine com-
panies, including in domestic banks. Both moves were
premised on the theory that greater foreign presence—
and thereby competition—would encourage sounder bank-
ing practices among local banks.
Has foreign entry indeed made domestic banks
more efficient?
This Notes—based on the findings of an earlier study
conducted by these authors—examines this matter and
presents some suggestions that may further improve the
operations of domestic banks.
Background/Framework
The research literature suggests that increases in
foreign bank entry and greater foreign ownership of do-
mestic banks provide benefits to a domestic banking
market. Three of the more important purported benefits
are: (a) domestic banks will be compelled to operate more
efficiently due to a narrowing of interest rate spreads
and a decline in profitability as new foreign competitors
reduce the market price of funds in an attempt to build
market share, (b) banking practices will improve as for-
eign banks tend to be less politically connected and less
likely to exert self-promotional influence on the regula-
tory authorities, and (c) many problems associated with
the lack of effective monitoring and prevalence of rela-
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tional banking practices that are characteristic of emerg-
ing market economies may be alleviated.
In the Philippines, family corporate groups control
a large portion of corporate assets and have significant
ownership in large commercial banks. A decline in family
group influence is argued to be associated with a de-
cline in the presence of relationship-based banking and
in turn may enable large commercial banks to better
monitor corporate activities.
Within the above framework, we looked into the ef-
fects of foreign bank entry and changes in foreign owner-
ship on the operation and structure of domestic banks
in the Philippines, using bank-level accounting data from
a sample of 16 expanded commercial banks (ECBs)1 and
general macroeconomic data for the period 1990-1998.
The changing banking landscape
The banking liberalization introduced with Republic
Act No. 7721 has obviously changed the landscape of
banking in the Philippines. For one, the number of
foreign-owned commercial banks increased from 4 in
1994 to 14 in 1995. On a percentage basis, this repre-
sents an increase from 12.1 to 31.1 percent of the total
number of commercial banks. Similarly, there has been
a gradual rise in the amount of total assets and liabili-
ties after 1995. From a decline in their average size ex-
perienced in 1995 (from P21.6 million in 1994 to P8.2
million in 1995), the foreign-owned commercial banks'
average size zoomed and even surpassed its 1994 level
at P29.8 million. This development indicates that foreign
banks have indeed taken more significant positions in
the Philippine banking sector. At the same time, the per-
centage of foreign ownership in domestic ECBs increased
markedly over the years 1992 to 1998. The average per-
centage ownership by foreign interests in the common
stock of domestic banks increased from 8.69 percent in
1992 to 14.81 percent in 1998.
The study's results
Effect of foreign bank entry
Evidence from the study indicates that foreign bank
entry is associated with a reduction in interest rate
spreads and bank profits. However, this finding holds true
only for domestic banks that are affiliated to a domestic
family business group. We surmise that a decline in group
ownership brought about by foreign bank entry, and there-
fore in the relational banking ties these business groups
have with certain affiliated domestic banks, creates an
environment in which these affiliated banks are signifi-
cantly affected by competition from the newly entered
foreign banks. It appears that group-affiliated banks on
the whole are affected more by foreign entry since they
had relatively higher pre-liberalization spreads. We take
this to be evidence of a decline in the influence of rela-
tionship-based banking.
In addition, as the relative size of the bank in-
creases, the greater the associated decline in interest
rate spreads and profits becomes. The study found that
the smaller ECBs responded to pending foreign competi-
tion by increasing their size more quickly than larger ECBs.
__________
1These ECBs comprise approximately 70 percent of the total assets
of the Philippine commercial banking sector. They are all publicly traded
in the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) and rank among the largest
1,000 corporations in the Philippines. Using them allows a direct inves-
tigation of the effect of foreign bank entry since the markets served and
the services provided by new foreign banks are comparable to those pro-
vided by the domestic ECBs. In addition, the analysis captures features
of ownership structure that have an important effect in the Philippines,
namely group affiliation and ownership concentration.
...A decline in group ownership brought about by
foreign bank entry, and therefore in the relational
banking ties these business groups have with certain
affiliated domestic banks, creates an environment in
which these affiliated banks are significantly affected
by competition from the newly entered foreign banks.
It appears that group-affiliated banks on the whole
are affected more by foreign entry since they had
relatively higher pre-liberalization spreads.3 No. 2002-06
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From these results, we surmise that group-affiliated
banks and faster growing ECBs possibly have better po-
litical connections and more established relationships,
thus, liberalization of foreign bank entry had a more pro-
found effect on their earnings and profits since their po-
litical influence might have been lost during this liberal-
ization period.
The study also found that generally, foreign entry
corresponds with improvements in operating efficiencies
but a deterioration in loan portfolios. Banking liberaliza-
tion, allowing increased foreign entry, resulted in greater
efficiency but it also led to an increase in loan loss provi-
sions. The latter supports the contention of Claessens,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) that domestic banks
are forced to take on less creditworthy customers due to
the increased competition brought by the entry of foreign
banks.2
Effect of greater foreign ownership in domestic
       banks
Results of the study show that increases in the per-
centage ownership by foreign investors in domestic banks
are associated with an increase in operating expenses
and a decrease in noninterest income. This increase in
operating expenses as the percentage of ownership in
domestic banks by foreigners increases is in contrast to
the general expected effect that the operating expenses
decline as foreign bank entry is allowed. This finding may
be comparable to that of Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar
(1999) which states that there is a component of liberal-
ization unrelated to entry that causes the administrative
costs of domestic banks to rise.3 Perhaps this is related
to an increase in intermediation costs resulting from
stricter provisioning and reporting requirements that ac-
companied liberalization. There may also be an increase
in costs, specifically those related to activities like the
hiring of higher-skilled employees, training of current em-
ployees, and the acquisition or upgrading of equipment
as banks prepare themselves for competition. This indi-
cates that increases in foreign ownership provide man-
agers the impetus to modernize their operations.
Other findings
The high levels of ownership concentration found in
the study's sample ECBs reveal that these banks are
__________
2Claessens, S., A. Demirg-Kunt, and H. Huizinga. 2001. How does
foreign entry affect the domestic banking market? Journal of Banking
and Finance 25: 891-911.
3Barajas, A., R. Steiner, and N. Salazar. 1999. Foreign investment
in Columbia’s financial sector. IMF Staff Papers 46(2). International
Monetary Fund.
4Kroszner, R. 1989. On the political economy of banking and fi-
nancial regulatory reform in emerging markets. Unpublished manuscript.
closely controlled. However, over our period of study, the
average level of concentration has declined. If one com-
pares ownership data for the pre-liberalization year of
1992 to that of the post-liberalization year of 1998, the
average insider ownership is shown to decline from 55.34
percent to 43.25 percent, respectively. In addition, it is
interesting to note how insiders are split between direct
insiders (defined as directors, officers, and related inter-
ests [DOSRI]) and group-affiliated companies. In 1992,
the total insider ownership portion was composed of
17.77 percent by DOSRI and 37.57 percent by group-
affiliated companies.  However, by 1998, DOSRI owner-
ship increased to 23.73 percent while group-affiliated
ownership declined to 19.52 percent. This suggests a
movement by group affiliates away from investments in
ECBs and may be a response to the banking and finan-
cial market liberalization. Group-affiliated companies were
Results of the study show that increases in the
percentage ownership by foreign investors in domestic
banks are associated with an increase in operating
expenses and a decrease in noninterest income. This
increase in operating expenses as the percentage of
ownership in domestic banks by foreigners increases is
in contrast to the general expected effect that the
operating expenses decline as foreign bank entry is
allowed.4 October 2002
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probably looking for other alternatives for obtaining funds
since their ability to extract wealth through bank owner-
ship declined. Apparently, these groups' capacity to use
coercive power over the state to capture rents at the
expense of other dispersed interests4 had waned in the
wake of recent changes in political governance and ac-
companying economic reforms.
General conclusions
Recent reforms in the Philippine banking sector that
liberalized restrictions on the involvement of foreign in-
terests appear to have resulted in favorable conse-
quences. However, the narrowing of interest rate spreads
is concentrated in banks with higher levels of group-affili-
ate ownership and the decline in operating expenses is
concentrated in fast-growing ECBs. This shows that the
intent of the banking liberalization to make domestic
banks more competitive and efficient has worked effec-
tively only for those Philippine banks that were able to
respond to this competition. In addition, group-affiliated
banks, although adversely affected in terms of revenues
and profits, are not found to have gained in efficiency
since they may be providing benefits to other group cor-
porations, thereby precluding them from markedly reduc-
ing operating expenses.
Entry of foreign banks is found to be also directly
related to an increase in risk. The increase in loan loss
provisions associated with foreign bank entry points to
the necessity of having increased monitoring of the fi-
nancial positions of domestic banks so that they can with-
stand external economic shocks as they improve their
financial positions. Responsibility of monitoring must rest
with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
The increase in the percentage ownership of for-
eign investors in domestic banks is shown to result in an
increase in operating expenses and a decrease in
noninterest income. The former may be explained by the
fact that increases in foreign ownership usually involve
the granting of incentives to managers to modernize op-
erations, thereby leading to increased intermediation
costs. The decline in noninterest income associated with
greater foreign ownership, meanwhile, supports a view
that with greater levels of foreign monitoring, domestic
banks reduce their dependence on nonbanking areas of
business.
Overall, the study supports the view of a general
weakening of relationship-style banking. Banks that are
likely to be more politically connected suffer greater de-
clines in spreads and profits and are able to reduce op-
erating expenses to a greater extent. These banks are
thus expected to become more independent and lose
much of their political influence. This should lead to bet-
ter lending practices where the allocation of funds de-
pends more on merit. As a consequence, liberalization
of foreign presence will have positive effects on Philip-
pine economic growth and enhance the ability of the do-
mestic economy to overcome negative external shocks.
Policy recommendations
Based on the aforementioned findings, the follow-
ing recommendations are hereby being made:
@ While Republic Act No. 7721 has liberalized for-
eign bank entry, foreign participation in the domestic bank-
ing market, however, is still limited, with the number of
foreign banks pegged to 14 and with restrictions on the
number of branches these foreign-owned banks may have.
In addition, foreign ownership of banks is currently lim-
ited in general terms to 60 percent.
...The intent of the banking liberalization to make
domestic banks more competitive and efficient has
worked effectively only for those Philippine banks that
were able to respond to this competition. In addition,
group-affiliated banks, although adversely affected in
terms of revenues and profits, are not found to have
gained in efficiency since they may be providing benefits
to other group corporations, thereby precluding them
from markedly reducing operating expenses.5 No. 2002-06
Policy Notes
The results of our study suggest that further open-
ing up of the domestic commercial banking market to
foreign participation may be beneficial for increased effi-
ciency of domestic banks. Specifically, increased foreign
competition should be encouraged by allowing more fully
foreign-owned banks to enter the domestic market, in-
creasing the number of branches allowed for each for-
eign-owned banks, and permitting greater foreign owner-
ship participation in domestic banks.
@ To mitigate the adjustment costs accompany-
ing greater market openness and the moral hazard prob-
lems associated with group-affiliated banks, further lib-
eralization of foreign bank entry and participation should
be done in conjunction with built-in safeguards. These
can be in the form of credibly enforced government su-
pervision and regulation as well as greater reliance on
market mechanisms in monitoring the banking system.
Prudential regulations and oversight by a governmental
agency are essential means of certifying some sense of
economic propriety by corporate groups. They can like-
wise temper the negative aspects of the relationship-
based system of bank governance in the Philippines.
Greater reliance on market mechanisms, mean-
while, is based on a premise that market forces can dis-
cipline bank managers by tempering their nonvalue maxi-
mizing behavior. This in turn further improves bank per-
formance. Greater reliance on market mechanisms in dis-
ciplining banks, however, requires better information and
disclosure by banks.
@ An increased level of transparency and informa-
tion disclosure also requires the disclosure of bank own-
ership information. Ownership data, in addition to bor-
rower data, must be provided in an accurate form to regu-
lators and should be made public, especially in cases of
larger ownership positions. This information is important
since ownership equates to influence over bank activi-
ties, especially lending. Lowering the mandatory owner-
ship disclosure from the current requirement of 10 per-
cent to 5 percent share of ownership, as in the United
States, and applying this to both private and publicly listed
companies may result to a higher degree of accuracy of
ownership information. The required information on
banks’ DOSRI loans and the amount of the DOSRI loans
and advances that have become past due should also be
detailed enough to disclose the identities of the parties
involved.
In the presence of credibly imposed prudential regu-
lations and supervision, and effective monitoring via the
market mechanism, group affiliation can be useful in ex-
tracting the benefits from a high degree of banking mar-
ket openness to foreign banks. Eventually, as high levels
of transparency and disclosure become an integral part
of domestic banking practices, the current banking cor-
porate governance system will be transformed from one
that is characterized by relational or social influence to
that with more formal controls.
As a result of increased foreign competition, cur-
rent domestic bank corporate governance structure will
eventually evolve into one with a higher level of manage-
rial professionalism and more diverse ownership struc-
ture. These features are expected to encourage improved
underwriting criteria, sounder banking practices, and a
reduction in relationship-style banking. Furthermore,
greater independence of commercial banks from family
corporate groups system will allow these banks to take
on the role of being more effective corporate monitors.
    
As a result of increased foreign competition, current
domestic bank corporate governance structure will
eventually evolve into one with a higher level of
managerial professionalism and more diverse ownership
structure. These features are expected to encourage
improved underwriting criteria, sounder banking
practices, and a reduction in relationship-style banking.6 October 2002
Policy Notes
For further information, please contact
The Research Information Staff
Philippine Institute for Development Studies
NEDA sa Makati Building, 106 Amorsolo Street
Legaspi Village, Makati City
Telephone Nos: 8924059 and 8935705;
Fax Nos: 8939589 and 8161091
E-mail: unitea@dlsu.edu.ph
jliguton@pidsnet.pids.gov.ph






















(Eduardo T. Gonzalez et
al.)
147 pages. PhP397.00
Impact of the East
Asian Financial Crisis
Revisited





(edited by Josef T. Yap)
654 pages. PhP817.00










(edited by Erlinda M.
Medalla)
Co-publisher: PASCN
402 pages. PhP795.00